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ABSTRACT
This study examines the impacts of life insurance asymmetrically on 
health expenditure and economic growth. Using the dynamic panel 
threshold model, we find that life insurance growth has a regime switch 
factor that may change the relationship between health expenditure 
growth and economic growth. Our results show that the asymmetrical 
information of life insurance growth affects the causal relationship 
between health expenditure growth and economic growth. In a low 
life insurance growth regime, the negative growth of life insurance 
can stimulate health expenditure and economic growth, which can 
have a positive feedback effect. However, in the interval of high life 
insurance growth, the growth does not affect health expenditure 
or economic growth; there is an adverse feedback effect between 
economic growth and health expenditure growth, whereby economic 
growth stimulates health expenditure growth, but health expenditure 
growth reduces economic growth.
1. Introduction
Research on the global medical economy has concentrated on the economic development 
and health expenditures of Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation 
(O.E.C.D.) countries to explore the impact of economic development on health expend-
iture. The findings demonstrate that health expenditures vary greatly in countries with 
similar levels of economic development. All O.E.C.D. countries apparently face continuing 
growth in health expenditures. According to OECD Health Data (2012), however, real health 
expenditure growth among O.E.C.D. countries has tended to slow or decline rather than 
stay on a long-term upward trend. As shown in Figure 1, public health expenditure growth 
in 2010 stopped and then fell by about 0.5%. Since the 2007–09 subprime mortgage crisis in 
the United States, O.E.C.D. countries have faced fiscal deficits. Public health expenditures 
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tended to remain constant before the subprime mortgage crisis, although reducing health 
expenditures and other financial burdens were considered. Real health expenditure cuts 
began in 2010, when the European debt crisis took hold.
In addition to issues of national revenue and expenditure, some of the literature suggests 
that reductions in health expenditures are related to national insurance systems or insur-
ance consumption. Some studies indicate that a country’s health insurance system affects 
its health expenditure (e.g., Gertler and Sturm, 1997; Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Joglekar, 
2008). However, the impact of private insurance has rarely been discussed, and there are 
no studies on macroeconomic issues. The early studies concentrated on microeconom-
ics-based cases. Cardon and Hendel (2001) argued that adverse selection is the main cause 
of insurance market failure. They established a structured adverse selection model to test 
the impacts of the insurance consumption of consumers with different risk preferences by 
using individual countries’ data and found no asymmetric information. Joglekar (2008) 
found that increased private insurance reduced out-of-pocket public health expenditure in 
Jamaica. Gertler and Sturm (1997) indicated that increased private insurance could reduce 
a government’s public health expenditures. Using Jamaican data, they found that increased 
private insurance could reduce the public health expenditures of the rich and improve 
private healthcare quality. They thus suggested that total governmental health expenditure 
should be reduced to focus on public healthcare provision to the poor.
This study discusses how the development of the life insurance affects the relationship 
between health expenditure growth and economic growth from the macroeconomic per-
spective and tests whether the asymmetry impact from life insurance growth affects the 
relationship between health expenditure growth and economic growth.
Our results show that the asymmetrical information of life insurance growth affects the 
causal relationship between health expenditure growth and economic growth. In a low 
life insurance growth regime, the negative growth of life insurance can stimulate health 
expenditure and economic growth, and health expenditure and economic growth have a 
Figure 1. average o.E.c.D. health expenditure growth rates in real terms, 2000 to 2010, public and total. 
source: authors.
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positive feedback effect. However, in the interval of high life insurance growth, the growth 
does not affect health expenditure or economic growth; there is an adverse feedback effect 
between economic growth and health expenditure growth, whereby economic growth stim-
ulates health expenditure growth, but health expenditure growth reduces economic growth.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. 
Section 3 introduces the study’s model and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 discusses the implications of the results, and Section 6 concludes the study.
2. Literature review
Based on the architecture of the Solow economic growth model, Newhouse (1992) argued 
that technological change is the most important factor driving health expenditure growth in 
several countries. Fuchs (1996) found that 85% of health economics scholars in the United 
States agreed with Newhouse’s proposal that technological change was the most important 
factor driving the rapid growth of health expenditure from the 1960s onward; he argued 
that the impact of insurance on the relationship between health expenditure and economic 
growth should be analysed with technological change in mind. Finkelstein (2007) empir-
ically tested the overall impact of the implementation of Medicare in 1965 on hospitals in 
the United States and found that hospital expenditures grew by 37%. This estimated result 
is six times higher than Newhouse’s (1977) estimated result from a health insurance exper-
imental study in the 1970s. This difference occurred because Finkelstein adopted an overall 
equilibrium analysis method and considered the impact of health insurance on market 
supply (hospital behaviour) and demand (consumer behaviour), while Newhouse used a 
partial equilibrium analysis method and considered consumer behaviour responses but 
not the impact on hospital behaviour. A comparison of the differences in the two analysis 
methods isolates the major factor driving health expenditure growth – the implementation 
of health insurance and associated technological innovation.
According to Finkelstein’s (2007) overall equilibrium analysis method, the implemen-
tation of health insurance changes not only the relative prices of medical services but also 
the nature and size of the medical service market, thus further changing the incentives for 
hospitals to enter the market and adopt new technologies. This particular analysis method 
allows Finkelstein to conclude that the implementation of health insurance can explain 
half of the health expenditure growth from 1965 to 1970. According to Newhouse (1977), 
health insurance implementation can explain one-eighth to one-tenth of health expend-
iture growth, at most. These differences in the estimations of the impact of health insur-
ance implementation on health expenditure growth occurred because Newhouse regarded 
technological change as exogenous without analysing the impact of health insurance on 
technological change, while Finkelstein regarded technological change as endogenous and 
health insurance as an important factor driving hospitals to adopt new technologies.
From the theoretical perspective, Hall and Jones (2007) analysed the continuous rise in 
the proportion of health expenditure against the rise in gross domestic product (G.D.P.) 
and found that it is a reasonable reaction to economic growth. The theoretical basis of this 
finding is the assumption that the marginal decreasing rate of consumption is greater than 
the marginal decreasing rate of medical service productivity returns. They argued that the 
assumption is not impractical. An individual with an increased income may increase pur-
chases of various commodities to increase utility levels according to preferences. Finkelstein 
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(2007) and Hall and Jones (2007) conclude that technological change is endogenous and that 
the major driving factor of technological change is income growth and the implementation 
of health insurance. This theoretical perspective’s policy implication is that the suppression 
of the growth of medical costs (total sum payment) via regulation will result in decreased 
health expenditure by the public sector, but overall health expenditure growth will not 
decrease. The impact does not affect people with high incomes but has an adverse effect on 
the access to medical services of people with low incomes.
In the past, health expenditure was regarded as a luxury. Baltagi and Moscone (2010) 
empirically found that health expenditure is, instead, a necessity in relation to national 
income.1 However, Wang (2011) argued that different economic growth rates or health 
expenditure growth rates may result in different relationships between economic growth and 
health expenditure growth – not necessarily relationships that are positive and significant. 
The elasticity of health expenditure against national income will change according to the 
given economic or health expenditure growth rates. Importantly, Wang (2011) introduces 
the exogenous variable of insurance market growth to examine the relationships between 
the two.
The role of insurance mostly involves the impact of public/out-of-pocket insurance. 
However, the relationship between financial market development and economic growth 
has been a subject of concern. The importance of the development of the private health 
insurance market on economic growth was gradually yet increasingly noted in the 1990s. 
Similar to the development of the banking industry and capital market, the development 
of the insurance industry occurred in response to the commercial and household demands 
on financial intermediaries. The value of insurance is in enabling various public and pri-
vate actors to take risks in stabilising the economy. If this function works as it is supposed 
to, insurance companies can use their reserves to boost capital markets and stimulate the 
economy.2
Previous studies have assessed the major issues in the relationship between insurance 
consumption and economic growth by focusing on a few countries and short sample periods 
(Catalan et al., 2000; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000) or special sectors (Beenstock et al., 1988; 
Browne and Kim, 1993). Das et al. (2003) empirically found that, from the perspective of 
the ripple effect, the impact of insurance on economic growth is negative. Blum et al. (2002) 
argued that the relationships between the insurance market and the real economic sector 
can be roughly divided into (1) having no relationship; (2) economic growth increases 
the demand for insurance (demand-following); (3) insurance growth results in economic 
growth (supply-leading); (4) insurance growth results in negative economic growth due to 
moral hazard behaviour; and (5) the two are mutual causes and effects (i.e., interdependent).
Haiss and Sümegi (2008) applied panel data to examine the relationship between insur-
ance and economic growth based on an endogenous growth model for the whole E.U., the 
E.U.-15+(including Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland), and the emerging C.E.E. countries 
(new EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe). They found an insignificant 
effect of life insurance on economic growth for the whole E.U. and E.U.-15+countries.
Han et al. (2010) also employed the generalized method of moments (G.M.M.) approach 
to examine the relationship between insurance development and economic growth for a 
panel data-set of 77 countries. The model adopted G.M.M. with instrument variables to 
avoid the over-identifying problem. The results indicate that the model does not suffer the 
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problem of over-identifying and validates the employed instrument variables. Their empir-
ical results showed evidence of a positive impact of insurance development on economic 
growth.
Recently, Lee and Chiu (2012), Lee et al. (2015), and Lee et al. (2016) used the panel 
approach to find the significant impacts of globalisation on economic growth and insur-
ance development. Chang et al. (2013) also found similar results with the bootstrap panel 
method. Hu and Yu (2014) thought that risk management in life insurance companies has 
significant economic impact. Additionally, Ihori et al. (2011), used the simulation analysis 
for data from Japan and found that Health insurance reform would affect economic growth.
This literature review is largely an analysis of the architecture of information symme-
try. The method overlooks the possible asymmetrical impact of insurance growth on the 
relationship between health expenditure growth and economic growth. Hence, the use of 
asymmetric information, multinational data, and the the dynamic panel threshold model 
(D.P.T.M.) in this study is novel.
3. Model and methodology
We construct the long-run relationship among national income, health expenditure, and 
insurance consumption as follows:
 
GDPit denotes per capita income at time t for country i, THEit is per capita health expenditure 
at time t for country i, and LSPit is per capita life insurance consumption at time t for country 
i. Coefficient Ai is autonomous health expenditure, Bi is induced health expenditure as the 
income elastic of health expenditure, and Ci is induced life insurance consumption as the 
income elastic of life insurance consumption. If panel cointegration exists, the short-run 




훥GDPit , 훥THEit ,훥LSPit
}�
 and Φi are the adjustment speeds of the error-correction 
model for country i. The error-correction term is ECMit−1 = GDPit−1 − Ai − BiTHEit−1−CiLSPit, 
which implies that short-run disequilibrium could return to long-run equilibrium through 
error-correction adjustment. When the threshold effect occurs, we set up a short-run 
D.P.T.M. as follows:
 
In Equation (3), 𝛥LSPit−d < 𝛾 implies that the life insurance growth rate is smaller than the 
threshold value, as in regime 1, while ΔLSPit−d ≥ γ implies that the life insurance growth rate 
is no smaller than the threshold value, as in regime 2. To test the causality between THEit 
and GDPit, the critical values are obtained by the bootstrap method.
(1)GDPit = Ai + BiTHEit + CiLSPit + uit



















21iΔZit−j + Φ2i(GDPit−1 − Ai − BiTHEit−1−CiLSPit) + 𝜀2it ,ΔLSPit−d ≥ 𝛾
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This study analyses how life insurance growth affects health expenditure growth and 
economic growth by expanding Hansen’s (1999) threshold model to allow the existence of 
the explanatory variables of the lag terms – that is, by using the D.P.T.M. in the empirical 
tests. The small sample bias refers to Appendix of Chen and Lin (2010). In empirical tests, 
bias correction is important. After using insurance growth as the threshold variable, the 
intervals create unbalanced panel data. Using the threshold model in the estimation, when 
t = 11 (years), observations at each interval may decrease in number. Thus, least squares 
dummy variable (L.S.D.V.) bias may be ignored in the D.P.T.M. Finally, the regression 
model includes exogenous variables (lag-term of variables) that can make the bias more 
complicated and close to the L.S.D.V. estimator equation (see Appendix A).3
4. Empirical results
The 24 sample countries used in this study comprise Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The sample period covers 1999 
to 2012. The data are taken from the OECD.Stat statistics database (http://stats.oecd.org/). 
The variables used include per capita G.D.P., per capita total health expenditure, and per 
capita life insurance premium. All variables are defined in Table 1. Natural logarithms of 
these variables are analysed in the empirical tests.
First, this study analyses trends in the time series data of individual countries. Figure 2 
illustrates G.D.P. trends in the 24 sample countries. All countries showed upward trends 
over time. In 2008, G.D.P. declined, possibly because of the impact of the subprime mort-
gage crisis. Figure 3 shows the total health expenditure trends, most of which are upward. 
Figure 4 illustrates the life insurance trends, which indicate that G.D.P. and total health 
expenditure have more significant volatility.
To verify the presence of a nonlinear relationship, this study analyses the relationship 
between life insurance growth and economic growth, as well as the growth of health expend-
iture. The kernel probability density function is applied in adapting the three insurance 
variables, using the rates of life insurance growth, economic growth, and health expenditure 
growth. Figure 5 shows the kernel density adaption line graphs depicting the relationship 
among life insurance growth rate (L.S.P.), economic growth rate (G.D.P.), and health expend-
iture growth rate (T.H.E.). The horizontal axis illustrates the kernel density distribution of 
L.S.P., while the vertical axis illustrates the kernel density distribution of G.D.P. and T.H.E. 
The L.S.P. is skewed to the right, and G.D.P. and T.H.E. are skewed to the left. The adaption 
Table 1. variables definition.
source: oEcD. stat database (http://stats.oecd.org/).
Variable name
Per capita gross domestic 
product
Per capita total health 
expenditure Per capita life insurance
code G.D.P. t.h.E. L.s.P.
variable description Gross domestic product/
per capita (expenditure 
approach)
international total expendi-
ture on health/per capita
total gross premiums-Life/
per capita
Frequency annual annual annual
currency Us dollar Us dollar Us dollar
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lines of the L.S.P., G.D.P., and T.H.E. kernels have a nonlinear relationship. In addition, 
when the L.S.P. standard deviation is −5, the kernel adaption lines of L.S.P. and T.H.E. jump 
upward, slowly changing the relationship from a positive correlation to a negative one. L.S.P. 
and G.D.P. are roughly positively correlated.
This study determines whether the variables are consistent with the stationary charac-
teristics using a panel unit root test. Table 2 shows the test results. Five testing methods are 
used: the t* testing method proposed by Levin et al. (2002), t-testing method proposed by 
Breitung (2000), W testing method proposed by Im et al. (2003), ADF-Fisher Chi-square 
testing method proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999), and PP-Fisher Chi-square testing 
method. The results suggest that the level items of the three variables have unit roots. After 
the first-order differentiation, the three variables are given stationary characteristics.4
To confirm the long-run cointegration relationship among the variables, this study applies 
the Kao residual cointegration testing method and Johansen Fisher panel testing method. As 
shown in Table 3, the model has a cointegration relationship. The long-run relationship is
 
The estimation result suggests that health expenditure has a positive impact on national 
income and that life insurance consumption has positive impacts on national income.
In the case of cointegration, the dynamic panel threshold error-correction model (E.C.M.) 
is estimated. In the estimation of the short-run model, the error-correction terms are estab-
lished according to Equation (4):
As Figure 5 shows, a change in life insurance consumption leads to an asymmetric relation-
ship among insurance growth, health expenditure growth, and national income growth. An 
(4)GDPit = 1.343 + 1.418THEit + 0.295 LSPit












Figure 5. the kernel density adaption line graphs depicting the relationship between life insurance growth 
rate, economic growth rate and health expenditure growth rate. source: authors.
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asymmetry test is conducted to confirm the asymmetrical adjustment mechanism. LSP is 
used as the threshold indicator variable.
This study adopts Hansen’s (1999) testing method to test the thresholds. Following the Akaike 
information criterion (A.I.C.), a lag term of 1 and threshold variables with the lag period d = 1 
of Equation (3) are used. Table 4 shows the test results. In the bootstrap likelihood ratio test (see 
Table 2. Panel unit root test.
note: We specified lags at 4 by minimum a.i.c. Exogenous variables: individual effects, individual linear trends. the notation 
‘***’ implied statistical significance at the 1% level. Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic chi-square distribution. 
Within the parentheses (.) as the p-value. all other tests assume asymptotic normality. When carrying out the test as well 
as the estimation, all variables are formed in natural logarithms.
source: authors.
Methods Y G L.S.P.
Levels 
Levin, Lin & chu t* test 8.641 −3.850*** −2.903*** 
(1.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Breitung t-stat test 12.445 0.933 4.220
(1.000) (0.825) (1.000)
im, Pesaran and shin W-stat test 6.696 −0.307 0.064
(1.000) (0.379) (0.525)
aDF-Fisher chi-square test 40.847 71.402 59.732
(0.972) (0.149) (0.413)
PP-Fisher chi-square test 8.378 67.068 50.406
(1.000) (0.258) (0.750)
Difference ΔY ΔG ΔLsP
Levin, Lin & chu t* test −7.593*** −13.102*** −9.891***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Breitung t-stat test 0.473 −3.380*** −0.119
(0.682) (0.000) (0.453)
im, Pesaran and shin W-stat test −4.462*** −8.212*** −3.572***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aDF-Fisher chi-square test 121.950*** 172.461*** 115.852***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PP-Fisher chi-square test 141.423*** 225.746*** 147.343***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 3. Panel cointegration tests.
note: in johansen Fisher Panel cointegration test, trace and max-eigenvalue test are according to the p-value of mackinnon 
et al. (1999). Within the parentheses (.) as the p-value. We specified lags at 1 by minimum a.i.c. the notation ‘***’ and ‘**’ 
implied the rejection of the null of no cointegration at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
source: authors.
Testing methods Statistics (p-value) 
Kao Residual Cointegration Test
aDF −4.863***
(0.000)




at most 1 22.440**
(0.013)





at most 1 20.600**
(0.024)
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Table 5), when using ΔLSPit−1 as the threshold variable, the model has a threshold of −0.165. 
Hence, the lag period of the threshold variable at 1 is used as parameter d for the empirical model. 







(훾), as shown in Figure 6, reflected in the first step ?̂?
1
 estimation and the re-estimation results 
of ?̂? r
2
 and ?̂? r
1
. The graph results are shown in Figure 6(a)–(c). The 1 and 2 threshold confidence 
intervals are used, and there is one threshold point.5
After confirming the existence of the threshold effect, a threshold model estimation is 
conducted. Table 6 shows the estimation results of the dynamic panel threshold E.C.M. 
model. Panel A uses ΔGDPit as the explained variable estimation results, while panel B 
uses ΔTHEit. As the results in panel A indicate, when in the interval of low life insurance 
consumption growth (regime 1) 𝛥LSPit−1 < −0.165, health expenditure growth promotes 
economic growth. However, life insurance consumption growth reduces economic growth. 
When in the interval of high insurance growth (regime 2) 훥LSPit−1 ≥ −0.165, health expend-
iture growth reduces economic growth. In regime 1 of panel B, economic growth promotes 
health expenditure growth. However, life insurance consumption growth reduces health 
expenditure growth.
Table 4. the linearity test for the threshold model (threshold variables lag-period d = 1).
note: the critical values (c.v.) are obtained by the bootstrap method. Prior to estimating the equation, within the paren-
theses (.) as the p-value. We need to determine the correct number of regimes to describe the underlying dynamics of 
economic growth. the likelihood ratio (L.R.) test with the values from the bootstrap method is reported in table 5.
source: authors.
Threshold variable ΔLSPit−1
Test for single threshold
threshold value [γ1] −0.165
F1 (L.R. test) 32.781***
Bootstrap p-value (0.000)
10%, 5%, 1% critical values 20.892, 23.749, 32.348
Test for double threshold
threshold value [γ1, γ2] −0.165, 0.406
F2 (L.R. test) 16.179
Bootstrap p-value (0.160)
10%, 5%, 1% critical values 18.500, 21.452, 24.262
Test for triple threshold
threshold value [γ1, γ2, γ3] −0.165, 0.241, 0.406
F3 (L.R. test) 15.645
Bootstrap p-value (0.120)
10%, 5%, 1% critical values 17.431, 18.341, 20.803
Table 5. the bootstrapping results.




95% Coefficients QUANT-value Lower bound 5%
Lower bound 
2.5%
0.034 0.033 −1.056 0.000 0.020 0.018
−0.068 −0.149 0.537 1.000 −0.879 −0.992
0.264 0.180 −0.027 0.646 −0.314 −0.355
0.085 0.075 −0.204 0.000 −0.041 −0.059
0.069 0.057 0.666 1.000 −0.095 −0.107
0.215 0.185 −0.116 0.018 −0.088 −0.106
0.079 0.061 −0.029 0.330 −0.082 −0.096
0.041 0.037 0.004 0.069 0.002 0.000
452   K.-M. WANG AND Y.-M. LEE


























































Figure 6.  the first threshold parameter confidence interval of (a) the single‐threshold model and (b) the 
double‐threshold model. (c) the second threshold parameter confidence interval of the double‐threshold 
model. source: authors.
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In addition, the short-run imbalance is adjusted to long-run equilibrium by the error-cor-
rection mechanism. The result of regime 1 in panel B suggests that economic growth pro-
motes health expenditure growth from the short-run disequilibrium adjustment. As shown 
in Table 7, in countries with low life insurance growth, health expenditure growth and 
economic growth have a positive feedback effect because life insurance growth is harmful 
to both economic and health expenditure growth. In countries with high life insurance 
growth, life insurance growth does not affect health expenditure or economic growth, while 
health expenditure growth does not increase economic growth but has an adverse impact 
on it. However, economic growth can promote health expenditure growth.







































































































note: the dynamic panel threshold E.c.m. model includes fixed-effect, the estimated coefficients have been corrected, and 






95% Lower bound 5%
Lower bound 
2.5%
Panel a Dependent variable: ΔGDPit−1
 Regime 1 ΔLSPit−1 < −0.165
−1.056(0.000) 0.034 0.033 0.020 0.018
0.537(0.000) −0.068 −0.149 −0.879 −0.992
−0.204(0.000) 0.085 0.075 −0.041 −0.059
−0.027(0.708) 0.264 0.180 −0.314 −0.355
 Regime 2 ΔLSPit−1 > −0.165
0.666(0.000) 0.069 0.057 −0.095 −0.107
−0.116(0.036) 0.215 0.185 −0.088 −0.106
0.004(0.138) 0.041 0.037 0.002 0.000
−0.029(0.340) 0.079 0.061 −0.082 −0.096
Panel B Dependent variable: ΔTHEit−1
 Regime 1 ΔLSPit−1 < −0.165
2.648(0.000) 1.262 0.961 −0.622 −0.796
−1.517(0.000) 0.085 0.083 0.055 0.053
−0.154(0.098) 0.212 0.184 −0.190 −0.241
−0.622(0.039) 0.825 0.516 −2.664 −2.972
 Regime 2 ΔLSPit−1 ≥ −0.165
0.517(0.000) 0.093 0.046 −0.260 −0.289
−0.237(0.037) 0.191 0.157 −0.222 −0.264
−0.007(0.489) 0.039 0.032 −0.048 −0.054
0.116(0.343) 0.432 0.394 −0.325 −0.392
Table 7. the causal relationships in two intervals.





“implied the positive causality effect, “
−
←���“ implied the negative causality effect, and 
“
x
←��“ implied the causality effect is insignificant.
source: authors.
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5. Discussion and implications
Table 7 clearly shows how the asymmetry effect of life insurance growth affects the causal 
relationship between health expenditure and economic growth. Philipson and Zanjani 
(2014) suggested that health impacts can result in asymmetric information. Several expla-
nations for this result are possible. First, in low (or negative) life insurance growth, there 
may be a substitution effect between life insurance and health spending but a negative wealth 
effect on economic growth. Thus, in the absence of insurance protection, economic growth 
must then be accompanied by increased health spending to maintain living standards. This 
phenomenon is similar to the findings of Joglekar (2008) and Gertler and Sturm (1997); 
moreover, Das et al. (2003) argue that insurance growth results in negative economic growth 
due to moral hazard behaviour. Second, amid high life insurance growth, the substitution 
effect between life insurance and health spending and the wealth effects of life insurance on 
economic growth may disappear. The government may then reduce health expenditures to 
avoid crowding out other government spending. This effect is consistent with the findings of 
Haiss and Sümegi (2008); it differs from Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) and Han et al. (2010), 
but they might be neglecting the asymmetric information of insurance market growth and 
failing to consider the relationship between health expenditures and economic growth.
6. Conclusion
This study discussed the impact of insurance factors while exploring whether insurance 
market growth can affect the causal relationship and direction between health expenditure 
growth and economic growth. Our results prove that the asymmetrical information of life 
insurance growth affects the causal relationship between health expenditure growth and 
economic growth. This study offers several main contributions to research. First, it con-
ducts a cross-national empirical analysis of how life insurance growth asymmetry impacts 
the relationship between health expenditure growth and economic growth in O.E.C.D. 
countries. The asymmetry impact triggered by life insurance growth can change the rela-
tionship between health expenditure growth and economic growth. The unique aspect of 
our research is that the asymmetric information in multi-nation insurance markets could 
produce different substitution and income (wealth) effects, deduct the different causalities 
of variables, and affect the fiscal expenditures of countries to health expenditures. These 
results are absent from previous research. Secondly, this study uses the D.P.T.M. to test 
the relationship between health expenditure growth and economic growth. By adding the 
impact of life insurance growth on economic growth, this study analyses the possible impact 
of life insurance growth rates (i.e., low and high insurance growth) on economic growth rates 
at various intervals. This indicates that different developments in international insurance 
markets influence the economic growth and fiscal policy of health expenditures in each 
country, these findings provide a reference that governments can use during their evalua-
tion and development of health expenditure policies as well as to assess possible changes 
caused by life insurance growth or the impact of health expenditure growth on economic 
growth. Finally, this paper does not consider the intra-relationship effects of variables, an 
issue for future research.
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Notes
1.  Similar to previous findings in Parkin et al. (1987).
2.  Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) suggest that, during the 1990s, China’s government and labour 
insurance schemes increased financial risk associated with household healthcare spending 
but that the rural cooperative medical scheme significantly reduced financial risk in some 
areas while increasing it in others (though not significantly). From their results, it appears 
that China’s new health insurance schemes (i.e., private schemes, including coverage for 
schoolchildren) have also increased the risk of high levels of out-of-pocket health spending.
3.  We using the bootstrap method to address heterogeneity or serial correlation.
4.  In a panel setting, McCoskey and Selden (1998) rejected the null of nonstationarity for health 
care expenditures and G.D.P., implying that the former ordinary least squares result could be 
reinforced, but they did not account for a time trend in their tests.
5.  The likelihood ratio testing for a threshold is based on the statistic F1 (test for single 
threshold). The asymptotic distribution of F1 is nonstandard and strictly dominates the Chi-
square distribution. If F1 rejects the null of no threshold (Equation (A9)), further testing to 
discriminate between one and two thresholds is required. Thus, an approximate likelihood 
ratio test of one versus two thresholds based on the statistic F2 (test for double threshold) is 
executed. If F2 rejects the null of one threshold, then the statistic F3 (test for triple threshold) 
– an approximate likelihood ratio test of two versus three thresholds – is required (see Hansen, 
1999). More information can be obtained about the threshold estimates from plots of the 
concentrated likelihood ratio function, as in Figure 6(a)–(c) (corresponding to the first-stage 
estimate ?̂?
1




). The point estimates are the value of γ at 
which the likelihood ratio hits the zero axis, which is on the far left of the graph. The 95% 








(훾) by the values of γ for 
which the likelihood ratio lies beneath the blue line.
6.  Efron and Tibshirani (1993) stated that the bootstrapping method can be applied to simulate 
the distribution of critical values for test statistics if the standard distribution of test statistics 
is unavailable under common test circumstances. However, Hansen and King (1996) stated 
that the asymptotic distribution of F1 test statistics can be obtained through the bootstrapping 
method. Hence, using the bootstrapping method to construct the p-value of F1 test statistics 
within asymptotic distribution is acceptable
7.  The Hansen (1999) P.T.M. does not include dynamic setting so the model could deduce 
the asymptotic distribution. This article employed the D.P.T.M. model to deal with the 
requirements of the endogeneity in a dynamic setting in the Panel model and the threshold 
setting, nonlinearity problems. It is very difficult to deduct the asymptotic distribution from 
this D.P.T.M. At the present time, we still cannot find any previous research that could deduct 
the asymptotic distribution. Therefore, the bootstrapping method is the best way to correct 
the error bias problem in D.P.T.M. The results in this paper validate this issue.
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Appendix A. Dynamic Panel Threshold Model
Developing further from the panel threshold model (P.T.M.) of Hansen (1999), we introduce these 
models with explanatory variables for lag length (delay). D.P.T.M.s are used to examine the tests, 
where small sample biases can be made by referencing the Appendix of Chen and Lin (2010). It is 
important to correct biases when performing research tests. In this study, exchange rate fluctuation 
is used as a threshold variable, and then each interval is found to become an unbalanced set of panel 
data. In addition, when estimations are made using the P.T.M., the observed values of each inter-
val are reduced. Under such circumstances, least squares dummy variable (L.S.D.V.) bias might be 
overlooked by D.P.T.M.s.
The panel threshold regressive model uses values of observable variables, and segments the data into 
multiple intervals rather than simply using cut-off points to divide them. Hansen (1999) stated that 
estimations using the least squares (L.S.) method reflected the asymptotic distribution theory. This 
study first applied the bootstrapping approach to correct biases of dynamic panel data, and then set 
the exchange rate fluctuations as the threshold variable. Threshold values are picked to divide the 
model into various regimes. Assuming that the model has two regimes, the regression model can 
be set out as follows:
 
where country i = 1,…,N; time t = 1,…,T; yit is the response variable; xit is the explanatory 
variable for the vector m; qit is the observed threshold variable; 훾 ∈ 훤  is the threshold esti-
mator parameter; Γ is the potential threshold estimated value; β1 and β2 are the slopes for 
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the two different intervals; and eit is the error term. I(qit ≤ γ) denotes the indicator variable: 
when qit≤ γ, the value is 1; otherwise, the value is 0. I(qit > γ) denotes the opposite variable.
The estimation steps are as follows: (i) when 훾 ∈ 훤  is given, first use the L.S. method to estimate 
the sum of squared residuals (S.S.R.); (ii) use the minimum S.S.R. to estimate the optimal threshold 
estimation value ?̂?; (iii) use the threshold value to divide the model into two regimes; and (iv) finally 
estimate each regime using the L.S. method.
This study used bootstrapping to correct the biases from the D.P.T.M. For a given 훾 ∈ 훤 , first 
obtain 𝛽1(𝛾) and 𝛽2(𝛾) under fixed effects, then compute ?̂?i(𝛾) and êit(𝛾) for all i and t. For each 






iT (훾)) was obtained from the repetitive substitution of 
êi(𝛾) = (ê i,−49(𝛾), êi,−48(𝛾),… , ê iT (𝛾)). For all i and t, bootstrapping sample can be collected from 












+ e∗it(𝛾). During the estimation process, data for the 
first I (number of countries) would be omitted. The remaining observed values are used to estimate 
훽∗1,b(훾) and 훽
∗
2,b(훾). Under a given γ, the corrected β1 and β2 can be defined as





























− 𝛽2,B(𝛾)ŷi,t−1I(qit > 𝛾)
� and (𝛽1,B, 𝛽2,B) = ( 𝛽1,B(?̂?B), 𝛽2,B(?̂?B)). 
We further considered the existence of external variable Equation (A1) in the dynamic panel model. 
For a given 훾 ∈ 훤 , we obtained the fixed effects of 𝛽1(𝛾), 𝛽2(𝛾), ?̂?1(𝛾), ?̂?2(𝛾), and further computed 











= (xi휏 , ei휏); s = 1,…,T; and τ randomly substitutes 
{1,…,T}). When the bootstrapped sample is obtained, the transposed parameter after corrected bias 
can be easily estimated.
After estimating the optimal panel threshold value ?̂?, the panel threshold effect test is conducted to 
examine whether the panel threshold effect is significant. The null hypothesis of the test is
 
Under the null hypothesis of Equation (A2), the threshold of this model disappears and 
becomes the model of Arellano and Bond (1991), which has no threshold:
    
Following estimation, the omission of µi leads to
    
The regression parameter β1 is estimated by ordinary least squares, yielding estimate 𝛽1, 
the residual error of ê∗i,t and the sum of squared errors S̃0 are ê∗
�
ê∗. Therefore, under the null 
hypothesis of Equation (A2), its test statistic is as follows:
          
Since the n.ull hypothesis of the model was defined as without a threshold effect (its thresh-
old value γ was not identified), the commonly used standard test statistics such as L.M. and 
Wald statistics cannot be used. Since the D.P.T.M. model is an extended P.T.M. of Hansen 
(A2)H0 :훼1 = 훼1 and 훽1 = 훽1
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(1999), we followed the suggestion of Hansen and King (1996) and used the bootstrapping 
method to simulate the critical value of F1 test statistics during the testing process.6 As soon 
as we discover the threshold effect, we can further test for the value of γ to determine the 
magnitude of the threshold effect. According to Hansen (1999), the null hypothesis test 
would then be H0: γ = γ0 and its proximity ratio
The above-mentioned asymptotic distribution of the LR1 test statistic was not a standard 
Chi-square distribution. Hence, we can use the standard approach to find the critical value 
of the test. Since the asymptotic distribution in this D.P.T.M. is unclear, we temporarily 
apply the methodology derived from Hansen (1999) to conduct the test. However, we are 
unable to determine whether it is completely consistent with the current settings of our 
model. This issue will be taken up in a future study.7 Here, we apply the formula suggested 
by Hansen (1999) to calculate the critical value of the significant level α:
When LR1(γ0) exceeded the critical value c(α), the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning 
that the effects from the application of D.P.T.M. are significant. For the next step, we take 
the previously estimated threshold value as given for our search of the second threshold, 
where ?̂?𝛾
2
 is the estimation for the second threshold value such that Equation (A7) is valid:










). After obtaining this variance, we conducted a test for the second threshold 
effect, for which the null and alternative hypotheses are respectively stated below:
H0: Only one threshold value.
H1: Two threshold values exist.
The F2 statistic of the corresponding test is given as
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Following Bai (1997), who stated that the estimation process of a double threshold regression 
model should hold the same asymptotic distribution as that of a single threshold regres-
sion model, we take the same approach of a single threshold regression model to construct 
the critical values for the test statistics in Equations (A9), (A10) and (A11). An approach 
similar to that suggested by Hansen and King (1996) was taken: the bootstrapping method 





(훾), we used Equation (A7) to calculate the critical value of the 
significant level α, as suggested by Hansen (1999). If two panel threshold effects existed after 
the test, we have to accept that as an assumption and re-estimate the data to further obtain 
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